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ABSTRACT 
Understanding performance can not only increase our theoretical grasp of music but reveal something of 
the general character of human experience.  Performance evokes a condition that affects the fundamental 
aspects of experience:  the perception of time and space, of the body and sensation, and of personal and 
social experience. A phenomenological description of performance from within the situation reveals a 
transformation of ordinary experience. Time and space are transfigured, body awareness and the sensory 
system are intensified, the dynamic character of musical experience is heightened, and its personal 
character is enlarged to encompass both audience and tradition, as the listener becomes an active 
participant in this process. 
 
 In recognizing the wide range of sensuous perception and at the same time the originary capacity 
of aesthetic experience, Mikel Dufrenne has shown us the rich capabilities of phenomenology.  It is in 
that spirit that this essay explores musical performance. 
 Music is a multiple art.  Its many traditions, forms, genres, and styles, its large variety of  
instruments and sounds, and its diverse uses and occasions make it difficult to speak of music as a 
single art form.  There are, nonetheless, certain common characteristics that all musics share in 
the ordering of successive sounds and silences in movement, pattern, and studied length.  And, 
of course, these sounds and silences must be devised and generated, usually by a person but 
increasingly by other means, especially electronic.  Finally, music has its contexts, the particular 
occasions when it is produced and heard.  Perhaps there is indeed a generic musical art, a 
common ground where all these disparities come together. 
 Yet the ontology of an art is, I think, a secondary concern.  Whether there is one art of 
music or many matters more for the philosopher of art than it does for the practitioner.  Yet this 
question has a wider interest because aesthetic theory and musical practice do not inhabit entirely 
different worlds.  While theory properly derives from practice in the effort to grasp cognitively 
what music activity is about, practice is itself often affected by theory, even if in ways that are 
subtle and indirect.  This happens not just in those obvious cases in which theoretical analysis, 
say of scale forms, tonality, or organizational principles, affects the practice of composers.  It 
occurs, too, in the way we come to listen to music and to appreciate it.  Inseparable from 
appreciation is the manner in which music is generated, usually at some point by live musicians, 
although electronic technology has begun to claim that function, as well.  Here, too, theoretical 
analysis may influence subsequent practice, as I hope this discussion will show. 
 The production of musical sound in performance may not seem quite at the heart of  the 
musical art, perhaps because it appears to be a circumstantial condition of music and not an 
essential feature.  Yet this, I think, is only apparent.   For music to take place, sound must be 
produced or deliberately shaped.  Although this may be done by mechanical and electronic 
means--the player piano or synthesizer can generate music--performance requires human agency.  
Yet a human catalyst must be involved at some point in these cases, too, and it may merge with 
the act of composition.  The matter of performance is still more complex, however, for we are 
inclined to overlook the role of the listener in this process.  Not only does the ear contribute 
materially to our auditory perception, but our attention and knowledge deeply affect what and 
how we hear.  And what the audience offers to musical occasions ranges from its aura of 
attention to exclamations, clapping, singing, and applause, affecting musician and listener alike.  
Performance, then, is a central function in music, and in some sense necessary for music to take 
place.  Pursuing the practice of performance can tell us a good deal about the 
musical art as a whole, including the composition and appreciation of music.   
  A better understanding of performance can not only increase our theoretical 
understanding of music.  It reveals something of the character and condition of human 
experience most generally.  For performance evokes a condition that affects the most 
fundamental aspects of experience:  the perception of time and space, of the body, of sensation, 
and of personal and social experience.  Moreover, such a transformation of ordinary experience 
affects both performer and listener in similar ways.  Whether and how all this may be, we shall 
have to see.  Whatever may be the case, I should like to develop a phenomenological analysis of 
performance in the varied domain of the musical art from the standpoint of a human performer.  
Because of its collaborative nature, an excursus into one element in the process of musical 
performance can contribute to our understanding of others.  The instance I have chosen is 
relatively uncomplicated and straightforward--the performance of classical Western music by a 
solo pianist.  Even though a phenomenological description of one such occasion cannot be taken 
as an account of all, perhaps it can serve as a model for others.   
II 
 Such an event is familiar to the musical public of this genre, and it is not difficult to give 
an objective description of what takes place.  A person walks on stage, sits down in front of the 
piano, adjusts to the instrument, and begins to play a well-rehearsed musical work.  The 
performance takes on a highly ritualistic form, not only in its style--that is, the way a particular 
work is rendered--but in the movements, gestures, pauses, applause, bows, exits, and returns for 
more bows or encores, all those peripheral goings on that 
constitute the theatrical aspect of the situation. 
 This account describes the situation from an observer's point of view.  It is relatively 
impersonal and uninvolved, and meets the criteria for objectivity that we associate with factual 
or scientific knowledge.  There is no reference in the account to private experience, either of the 
performer or the audience; no reference to qualities, awareness, feelings, or other such 
intangibles.  Understanding the event on this descriptive level doesn't even require being 
present, since one could gain such information about a particular performance by questioning 
those who were there or by setting up some sort of recording device, such as a video camera.  
Any experiential factors one might think of including are unqualified for consideration by this 
"objective" method and dismissed as subjective.  Is everything accounted for here or is 
something missing?    
 Such an account is partial, at best.  Taken as complete, this procedure and the objective 
description it yields are unexciting and misleading.  They turn performance into a formal ritual 
with a predetermined sequence of behavior.   Worse, they mislead the prospective performer 
about the actual situation he or she will experience.  On this account performance assumes the  
proportions of an intimidating object that, in its very impersonality and objectivity, stands over 
and apart from the human participant.  The performer who is part of this formalized object 
inhabits an alien place, is literally out of place.  She does not feel like herself, she does not 
recognize herself; indeed, she has lost herself.
1 The discussion in this essay, however, 
is not about personal experiences, of which there is a wide range.  Nor is it concerned 
with the psychology of performance, although the analysis I shall pursue has 
implications here.  My interest is rather philosophical, more particularly, metaphysical.   
 But what if we abandon the observer's point of view and explore the experience of 
performance from within?  A phenomenological description would follow this approach, and 
one could develop this from the perspective of the performer or the audience.  Although I shall 
mainly pursue the first, the two begin to merge in interesting ways, as we shall see.
2
   
                                                          
1  Under such circumstancesit is not surprising when a person becomes fearful. This, I 
suspect, is a central factor in performance anxiety.  For not only is the performance 
objectified; the performer becomes an object in an impersonal ritual.  He or she is the 
object of the audience's attention, the defenseless point at which all the vectors of 
psychic force converge.  And as the focus of critical discernment, the performer as 
object is exposed in all his inadequacy.  Few situations could be more intimidating.   
 
2  It is important to make clear that the descriptive analysis that follows is not intended 
either as a proof or as a record of common experience.  Obviously personal 
experiences vary widely, and exceptions can be found to any claim.  What I claim, 
however, is that this account is meaningful and that the analysis of time, space, and 
motion that follows describes a metaphysical order, not an experience of which the 
performer must be aware.  It is a metaphysics of experience, not a psychology of 
experience. 
III 
 Early in An Introduction to Metaphysics, a remarkably musical essay both in its structure 
and its perceptions, Henri Bergson notes that there is a profound difference between knowledge 
and intuition.  Knowledge, he claims, grasps things by means of concepts, freezing them in 
place and objectifying them, so that they can be formulated into concepts and grasped by the 
intellect.  This, he acknowledges, is a powerful method, one used with extraordinary 
effectiveness by the sciences.  Intuition, on the other hand, steps into the flux of the world, 
knowing it from the inside by an intimate acquaintance with its workings.  Knowledge, works 
by distancing oneself;  intuition by entering into and joining with them object, and this, Bergson 
holds, provides metaphysical understanding.  Bergson pursues this insight through many forms, 
for it has broad application and many uses in philosophy.   
 Although there was no connection between Bergson and Edmund Husserl, who 
originated phenomenology (apart from the curious coincidence that both were born in 1859), 
Bergson's account of intuition bears a striking resemblance to the kind of perception through 
which phenomenologists attempt descriptive analyses.  Moreover, it suggests that there is a kind 
of knowing that takes place in the directness of perceptual engagement.  It is such an encounter 
that I want to explore here, hoping to discover in the experience of performance a kind of 
knowledge, yet one that retains the living touch of the occasion that precipitated it. 
 The performer necessarily comes at the music from within.  Although a listener may 
escape the compelling force of the situation by inattention, daydreaming, or sheer irrelevance, it 
is difficult for a performer to assume such a degree of remoteness from the music he or she is 
playing.  Of course, it is possible to do so by abandoning oneself entirely to motor habit or by 
drug-induced dissociation.  Yet such events are uncommon, and the playing is likely to reflect 
this by a mechanical and lifeless quality.  Most often the performance situation catapults a 
musician into a rare and unusual condition, one that reveals the basic features of experience with 
eloquent directness, free, at least to some extent, from the usual overlay of cultural and 
philosophical presuppositions that nearly always obstruct our awareness.  What is this 
perceptual condition like? 
 The most striking thing about the experience of performing,  regarded from the inside, as 
it were, is that the constitutive perceptual domains of experience are transformed from their 
ordinary state.  As one moves toward the piano, the time-space continuum widens enormously.  
It is as if one were entering an immensely extended space, a space that is both fluid and 
temporal. This is not the neutral, objective, empty medium by which science defines the 
dimensionless realm within whose coordinates extended objects can be located precisely.  
Phenomenal space is connected to the perceiver. It is lived, not objective; personal, not formal.  
And it is experienced not only as spatial but equally as dynamic and temporal.  It may or may 
not appear intimidating, depending on one's experience, expectations, and psychophysical state, 
and these affect its perceived dimensions.  Unlike the physical definition of space as empty, 
space in performance is thick, fluid, almost palpable.  It is not just the area in which the musical 
activity takes place but it becomes a participant in that activity.  The position of the performer in 
musical space resembles a rock in Japan that is taken to represent the mononoke that suffuses the 
area.  Such a rock does not oppose the space that surrounds it but rather acquires the quality of 
that space and condenses it.  In a similar way, the performer is the spatial focal point, energizing 
that space as the nucleus in which it is concentrated.  Furthermore, the space of performance is 
energized by the musician.   The manner in which the pianist walks to the instrument conveys a 
distinctive charge to the space, a temporal as well as a dynamic charge.  The medium thus is not 
purely spatial but a continuity and interpenetration of space, time, and movement, the basic 
constituents of experiential reality.  This medium becomes the condition of the singularly 
creative act of performance. 
 This dynamic spatio-temporal medium is concentrated in the performer and diffused in 
the audience and throughout the hall, yet it is nevertheless homogeneous.  We can grasp one 
aspect of this in acoustical terms, for as the pianist begins to play, the hall becomes a great 
resonating chamber,  as much a part of the occasion as the space that surrounds a sculpture or 
the volume that a building encloses.   This points up the curious connection between the 
dynamic spatio-temporal medium of performance and the auditory space that the sounds create, 
for there are other aspects of music's multi-dimensional spatiality.  The sounds, themselves, 
have a spatial quality, ranging from broad to narrow, thin to dense, tangible to elusive.  We 
speak of the volume of musical sound, a spatial metaphor, to denote the scale of soft to loud:  a 
booming passage looms larger than a quiet one.  A real sense of spatial volume appears in the 
shape and range of a musical line as it moves through time; in the texture of a passage, which 
could be characterized as thin, dense, or wide; in the timbre of the instrument, as hard or 
rounded; and in the vertical distribution of musical sound, such as being full, open, broad, or 
narrow.  Some composers dwell on these qualities more than others do, and although an 
emphasis on such qualitative dimensions are a hallmark of impressionism, we find them in many 
other musical styles.  Composers of different periods develop their medium of sound in their 
own distinctive manner--the translucency of Mozart, Beethoven's thick and sometimes massive 
chords, the poetic resonance of Chopin, Bartók's percussiveness.  And of course the distinctive 
timbre of the piano contributes its own properties as a medium, with its hard, sharp attack, rapid 
decay, and fusion of individual notes when they are sounded simultaneously.  At times the 
instrument becomes melismatic as a coloratura, at others ponderous as a Russian bass.  As the 
music begins, the sounds in performance become tangible in the space of performance, given 
shape by the fingers as they play, much as a potter molds her clay.  Thus the sounds join with 
the pianist and the audience to become the medium of performance, fusing space, time, and 
movement into fluid continuity.   
IV 
 We find ourselves, then, in a multi-dimensional continuum, where the manifestations of 
time are spatial, the activation of space is temporal, and the movement of sound the generator of 
auditory space-time.  A fragmenting analysis of this situation into space, time, and motion may 
serve logistical or managerial purposes, but it is misleading as a means of grasping the 
experience of performance.  From the standpoint of the pianist, these factors coalesce and 
intensify in the perceptual acuity of performance. 
 Musical sound is thus intimately bound to the experience of time, space, and movement.  
Before the pianist begins playing, the hush of silence resembles a great void within which the 
performer can easily feel like a tiny figure in an enormous abyss.  The experience resembles that 
of the painter confronting a blank canvas or the writer an empty sheet of paper.  Silence, 
soundlessness itself, thus assumes a spatial aspect, just as the music does when the pianist begins 
to play.  For the performer the experience is one of shaping auditory space, of the silences as 
well as the sounds that are indicated in the score.  The indeterminacy of time-space that is 
apparent before the playing begins, the inchoate emptiness before the musical sounds emerge, 
progressively acquire definition in the ongoing course of performance.  The performer re-enacts 
the genesis of a determinate world out of formlessness and void.   
 The creation metaphor is apposite in still another way, for part of the perceptual 
experience is a sense of the sacredness of this time-space.  As in a cathedral when a service is 
about to start, the reverential hush of anticipation as a performance is to begin inspires a sense of 
deference, vulnerability, and humility before a larger power.  Religious experiences vary, of 
course, but at their most uplifting and affirming they share something of wonder at our capacity 
for continual reaffirmation and of the possibility of transcending the narrow boundaries of the 
separate self.  Many things tempt us to violate such  reverence in the performance situation, 
such as the distractions of the social setting and the objectifying demands of the self-gratifying 
ego.  These are devilish temptations for performer and audience alike.  Yet when they are 
overcome and replaced by an 
awareness of the sacred powers at work, a sense of wonder arises in the marvel taking place as 
the pianist brings sounds into being and shapes them in the act of playing.  To employ another 
religious metaphor, as the performer plays, the emerging sounds create a real presence.  Does 
not music here become holy?  
  A profound feeling of respect, even awe, infuses the mood and enjoins us against 
violating that charmed state of dwelling in the musical medium.  Inseparable from this sense of 
respect is wonder at the miraculous event we are participating in, this act of bringing sounds into 
being out of the indeterminate emptiness of silence and of shaping them in the act of playing.  
The use of still another theological term here, 'miracle,' is rhetorical, but it is not casual rhetoric.  
For this act of creation ex nihilo, so to speak, partakes of that religious mystery, and the wonder 
of it never quite disappears if the performer retains a fresh and sensitive awareness of what is 
happening.   
 This account, however, is not meant to suggest that musical performance is a "spiritual" 
exercise.  Far from it.  The years of training hands, arms, ears, and the entire body in the 
development of pianistic technique involve hard physical work.  Joseph Hofmann, the early 
twentieth-century virtuoso pianist, measured in foot-pounds the energy expended in playing the 
instrument and found it to be equivalent to more overt forms of great physical exertion.  The 
somatic aspect an aspect of the pianist's perceptual engagement in the music; indeed, it is the 
locus of performance anxiety.  Pounding heart, trembling fingers, profuse perspiration, shaking 
knees--the list of physical symptoms is painfully long.  At the same time, when anxiety is 
reinterpreted, the somatic experience of performing is exhilarating.  The pianist experiences a 
wondrous lightening of the limbs; the body feels charged with an intense, limitless, yet focused 
energy; the fingers become marvelously supple.  The entire body is transmuted into a powerful 
yet sensitive instrument, actually part of an instrument, for it unites with the complex mechanism 
of the piano--that construction of wood, metal, felt, and leather--to become a single performing 
instrument.  It is easier to visualize this union in the case of a violinist or other string player, or 
perhaps even more with a woodwind performer, where breath and body generate the sound 
directly and the human form envelopes the instrument.  For the pianist, the greater drama of the 
instrument and the inherent theatricality of a piano performance compensate for bodily distance. 
 Central to somatic involvement in music is the enhancement of sensory awareness.  This 
lies at the heart of the intensity of the performer's experience.  Hearing becomes more acute, the 
sense of touch more sensitive and delicate, overall perceptual awareness swells.  This 
heightening of perception runs its own dynamic course; ideally it parallel in its shape and 
nuances the processual unfolding of the music.  Such an isomorphism leads to a fusion of music 
and player:  
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance, 
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
3
                                                          
3  William Butler Yeats,  "Among School Children." 
 Each factor in the musical field  contributes to the performance.  
Just as the audience responds to the presence of the pianist, the pianist 
senses the receptivity of the listeners, and when a performance is most 
effective, a powerful bond joins them together.  The same reciprocity that 
fuses the musician with the instrument and the performer with the 
audience develops with the physical space.  Pianists play differently in 
different halls, for their size and resonance, together with design and 
decor, affect the degree of intimacy, subtlety, and power of the playing.  
So, too, do audiences respond to the setting.  Acoustics obviously plays a 
major part in this, for dead spots or muffled sound  in a particular location 
cannot help but diminish the effectiveness of a performance.  Even 
obscured vision has an influence, for as with the interdependence of smell 
and taste, hearing and vision are intimately bound together in musical 
perception.  Music is not only an auditory art but, like the other arts, is 
synaesthetic.  Further, in a live and responsive auditorium, the listener 
easily becomes enveloped in the sonorous space.  At its most fulfilled, the 
entire situation is bound up in the process of the music:  player, 
instrument, sound, audience, hall, all fuse into a complex union.  In a 
sense there is not one performer but many, for whatever activates the 
occasion--pianist, audience, even the composer--contributes to the event.  
History is involved, as well, as the knowledge, experience, and influence 
of past performances affect both the pianist and the audience, and join 
with the origins of the work in the composer's perceptual experience.  
Even though the vantage point differs, a phenomenology of musical 
performance is thus at the same time a phenomenology of musical 
listening and a phenomenology of musical creation. 
 Performance, moreover, has some of the qualities of a ceremony:   
A musical performance is also a musical ceremony.  There is theater, 
there is ritual, there is the deliberate entering into sacred space.  At its 
most successful, the musical event becomes a vital ritual, rich with a 
content that infuses life into its formal features and renders its substance 
vibrant with the dynamic actuality of a living presence.   
 
V 
 Does this descriptive account of musical performance tell us 
anything about the kind of intuitive, metaphysical knowing that Bergson 
identified?  Surely it is not amiss to consider experience that transforms 
space, time, and motion--the basic components of the human structuring of 
reality--as having profound metaphysical significance.  Whether this says 
something about the order of reality or only about the order of human 
experience, as Kant held, and whether we can go somehow from such 
experience to Being itself, as Heidegger endeavored to do, are questions 
we can only raise here.  At the very least, the kind of experience in which 
performance engages us may be said to embody intuitive knowledge of 
such matters, much as Bergson suggested.  Neither argument or proof, 
musical experience carries its own credibility in itself.  Perhaps this has 
something to do with the power of music and the other arts to affect us in 
deep and enduring ways.  Sufficient in itself, music nonetheless speaks to 
us in a strange and distant tongue. 
 This account has further philosophical implications.  If its 
description of the the experience of musical performance is accurate, it 
raises important questions about the customary explanation of aesthetic 
experience which, guided by Kantian theory, attempts to integrate it into a 
larger, consistent framework that also includes science and morality.  In 
these, the demand for objectivity and universality has traditionally been 
paramount, and aesthetic experience, while individual and subjective, is 
still held to be bound by these same constraints.  For Kant this took the 
form of a subjective judgment that can only impute universal agreement to 
everyone.
4
   Yet irrespective of the question of whether such a goal can 
be achieved in these other domains, and, in fact, whether and in what 
respects such a goal is even desirable in ethics and science, it is certainly 
not supported in this instance of the musical arts nor, I suspect, would it be 
in others.  While certain general transformative conditions may regularly 
occur in the reconfiguration of time, space, and motion, how and to what 
degree these are altered depends on particular conditions, such as the 
individual performer, the hall, the audience, and the many circumstances 
peculiar to the specific occasion.  Music, nonetheless, remains broad in its 
appeal, powerful in its force, and striking in its implications.  Even if, as 
this description suggests, it does not conform to the assimilationist 
convention that regards music as a "universal language," it has lost none 
of its strength as an occasion of profound experience.  Indeed, these final 
comments indicate how music, in a full reversal of cognitive priorities, 
may in fact serve as a model for reconsidering other conventional 
                                                          
4  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, §8, trans. J. H. Bernard 
(New York:  Hafner, 1951), pp. 48-51.   
philosophical presuppositions in morality and science.
5
 
 
NOTES 
                                                          
5  I have discussed various versions of this essay with Robert 
Cantrick, Anne Chamberlain, Nancy Ellen Ogle, Riva 
Berleant-Schiller, and Albert Stwertka, and I am grateful for their 
comments and suggestions. 
